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Where are we now in the Debate about the First Great Debate? 
 
Peter Wilson 
 
Much progress has been made in understanding what happened in the early 
years of the field of International Relations (IR) and how it came to be 
represented as it did. While there may not be a consensus on how the early 
decades of IR should be characterized, the simplistic representations that 
held sway in the past are now widely rejected, and there is a far greater 
appreciation of the complexity of the ideational and discursive reality of the 
time. It is gratifying that my “Myth of the First Great Debate” (Wilson 1998) 
was a spur to the growth of this appreciation. But while I have contributed to 
this growth in various ways since its publication, particularly through my work 
on Woolf, Carr and Murray, I have not hitherto engaged, at least not directly, 
with the other main contributions to what might be called the debate about the 
first great debate. This is what I intend to do in this concluding chapter, with 
the overriding objective of discerning where we are now in this debate. 
 
PROCESS OR PROGRESS? 
 
Andreas Osiander contends that the central premise of early IR writers was 
not so much a notion of progress, but “inescapable, directional historical 
process” (Osiander 1998: 409-10). These writers had a directional as 
opposed to cyclical philosophy of history. Their great insight was that 
international relations were not static but evolving. The dominant 
 2 
conservative/“realist” view of the unchanging nature of international life failed 
to take into account the huge forces for change unleashed by the industrial 
revolution. The world was becoming increasingly and inexorably integrated. 
Any understanding of modern international relations had to embrace this 
process and the dynamics propelling it—and also understand that while 
interdependence had grown almost naturally, the means of controlling it had 
also experienced remarkable, and largely spontaneous, growth. These were 
manifested in the array of official and unofficial bodies, organs, and 
associations, to which Woolf gave the name “international government”, which 
had sprung up since the early nineteenth century. According to this view world 
politics was in transition towards greater organization. A propos, the League 
of Nations was not a revolutionary but the latest and most striking 
development in a deep rooted socio-economic and political process. 
 
Osiander is right to emphasise this ‘process’ aspect of the thought of early IR 
thought. While some earlier studies of the period have eluded to it, they have 
arguably not given it the weight it deserves. Yet it could be contended that the 
distinction between progress and “inescapable directional historical progress” 
is somewhat specious. Is not the direction identified by these thinkers always 
“forward”? Does this not imply progress? Osiander himself provides evidence 
to this effect. He suggests, for example, that there is a philosophy of history 
behind Zimmern’s view of international relations that bears a striking 
resemblance to Kant’s thesis about reason and progress in Idea for a 
Universal History and Perpetual Peace (Osiander 1998: 420). He explicitly 
refers to Mitrany’s view of progress, self-consciously Kantian, as an inevitable 
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if laborious product of tensions embedded in history (Osiander 1998: 421). He 
refers, to give one further example, to a chronological sequence common in  
early twentieth century IR thinking that is pretty explicitly progressive: 
involving evolution, though not always smoothly, from the power politics of the 
past to the cooperative interdependence of the future (Osiander 1998: 427). 
 
An additional objection can be made. While the assumption of an 
“inescapable directional historical process” driven by industrial modernity was 
a prominent feature of the writing of the cluster of internationalists with whom 
Osiander is most concerned, namely Angell, Woolf, and Zimmern, it is not a 
prominent feature in the writing of all the significant internationalists of the 
time. The idea of a creative tension between economic integration and 
political fragmentation, between the forces unleashed by the industrial 
revolution and those unleashed by the French Revolution, was far from 
universally shared. The idea is not prominent in the writing, for example, of 
Philip Noel-Baker (see Lloyd 1995), David Davies (see Porter 1995, 2002), 
and Gilbert Murray (see Wilson 2007, 2011). The “industrial modernism” that 
Osiander identifies as a striking feature of “idealism”—and it should be noted 
here that while rejecting the traditional over-simplified image of IR idealism, 
Osiander asserts, contra Long and Wilson (1995), that it still makes sense to 
talk of a unified and distinct idealist paradigm—is not a universal feature. In 
brief, Osiander’s construction of the idealist paradigm is in fact a partial 
reconstruction. In effect, he has dismantled the paradigm and rebuilt it with 
the materials he finds most to his liking, discarding those that do not fit his 
particular account. His “alternative narrative” to the “founding myth of the IR 
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discipline”1 does not, therefore, quite hold true. Similarly, it is not quite true to 
say that revisionist writers, while successfully putting a ‘dent’ in this founding 
myth, have not offered an alternative narrative (Osiander 1998: 411). One 
alternative narrative is that there was no coherent and self-consciously idealist 
school of thought in the inter-war period. Rather, this period spawned a 
diversity of liberal schemes for war avoidance which self-styled “realists” were 
to erroneously, and damagingly for disciplinary development, lump into a 
single “idealist/utopian” box (Wilson 1995; Long 1995).  
 
For these reasons I do not feel the need modify my original position that a 
core characteristic of early twentieth century liberal internationalist thinking is 
belief in the possibility of progressive change: belief that the world does not 
have to look the way that it is, and that through reason, courage, imagination 
and determination it is possible to arrive at a better way of being and living 
(Wilson 1995: 13; 1998: 10; see also Sylvest 2004, 2009). I readily concede, 
however, that for some writers a more peaceful and orderly future was 
immanent in history. In particular, it was immanent in industrial modernity, and 
its achievement therefore was not wholly a matter of will or “agency”. 
  
While maintaining my original position on the character of early liberal 
internationalism I certainly accept Osiander’s observation that post-war 
reconstructions of “idealism”, starting with Carr, overlooked the “process 
dimension” of much early twentieth century internationalist thought, and 
underestimated the extent to which it underpinned liberal faith in progress 
(see e.g. Bull 1969: 33-36). But why did they fail in this regard? Osiander 
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does not answer this question. In the case of Carr, the author of the most 
famous reconstruction, the picture is complicated. It is true that the political 
thought of two of Carr’s main utopian targets, Norman Angell and Alfred 
Zimmern, contained this process dimension, but Carr discounted it. Those 
further to the left of the political spectrum whose thought contained this 
dimension in abundance -- e.g. Leonard Woolf, Harold Laski, and David 
Mitrany -- interestingly were not condemned by Carr as utopian. This 
dimension was particularly strong in what later became known as new liberal, 
welfare or constructive internationalism (see Suganami 1989: 100-11; Sylvest 
2004: 414-16). This outlook has been plausibly identified as one of three 
which together constitute the broad church of inter-war liberal 
internationalism, the other two being Hobbesianism and Cobdenism/non-
interventionism (Long 1991: 293-99). While logically separable, in the thought 
of actual thinkers of the period these strands of liberal internationalism were 
often intertwined, their salience being issue-specific and conditioned by 
circumstance. That is, depending on the issue at stake, or the prevailing 
political circumstances, political thinkers and publicists such as Angell, Woolf, 
or Zimmern, would frame their broadly liberal, progressive, League 
internationalist argument in terms of one strand or another. The Hobbesian 
strand was most prominent at times of acute international crisis. The 
Cobdenite strand was most prominent in international economic matters, 
reflecting inter alia the free trade and “open door” orthodoxy of the League. 
The third welfare internationalist strand was most prominent when it came to 
matters of post-war reconstruction and (Osiander makes this point most 
persuasively) in opposing traditional (i.e. realist/conservative/sceptical) 
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doctrines of foreign policy and attitudes towards international reform. These 
three stands were not part of a carefully delineated, methodologically 
rigorous, and systematically constructed international political ideology, but 
rather discursive strategies used as the need arose by a variety of peace-, 
reform- and League-orientated thinkers. Used, it should be said, quite 
naturally. Not “weapons of choice” in an armory as much as increasingly well 
rehearsed responses to a range of practical and intellectual problems. With 
regard to Carr, however, the fact that needs to be stressed is that he shared 
this “process” view of history, paradoxically maybe given his realist reputation. 
This goes some way in explaining why Carr understood utopianism—contrary 
to subsequent portrayals—in terms of the first two strands but definitely not 
the process-orientated, welfare internationalist, third. Carr did not condemn, in 
other words, all forms of liberal internationalism. He not only happily 
embraced but arguably was the most able2 champion of the welfare 
internationalist form. So by this necessarily complicated route we can begin to 
see that Carr did not overlook the “process dimension” in his treatment of 
idealism/utopianism. Rather he never conceived idealism/utopianism in terms 
of this particular understanding of the historical process. For Carr, in other 
words, this was not a “dimension” of idealism/utopianism at all. On the 
contrary it was a fact of modern economic and social life that any realistic plan 
for international reform (for which his Twenty Years’ Crisis cleared the way 
and laid the foundations, and his Conditions of Peace erected the 
superstructure) needed to thoroughly take into account (see Wilson, 2001). 
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One final point is worth making about Osiander’s account. He demonstrates 
that early twentieth century IR thinkers were conversant with the way of 
thinking that would later be called realism. Realism did not come at them in 
1939 as a bolt from the blue, as a consequence, as it is sometimes 
suggested, of some kind of Kuhnian scientific anomaly (see Vasquez 1983: 
13-19). Far from it, they were thoroughly aware of this outlook (characterising 
it in terms of the international anarchy, state sovereignty, endemic war, and 
the balance of power); they had names for it (e.g. ‘the diplomatic orthodoxy’; 
see Osiander 1989: 414; Wilson 2003: 32); and much of their work was 
addressed implicitly or explicitly in opposition to it. For this reason, argues 
Osiander, the so-called first great debate between idealism and realism does 
deserve its name. The work of early twentieth century IR authors consisted in 
part of “an ongoing, explicit or implicit dialogue with the position later labelled 
Realist” (Osainder 1998: 415). What Osiander is referring to here, however, is 
not so much a first great debate in the discipline of IR between two well-
defined, opposing, and self-conscious schools of international thought. Rather 
he is referring to what Carr called the twin elements of international political 
life, utopianism and realism, which are always present when the relations 
between independent political communities were discussed. It is the dialogue 
between those who accept the international anarchy as an immutable fact of 
life and work within its constraints, and those who seek to transcend it or at 
least substantially mitigate its most damaging effects e.g. great power war. It 
is idealism/utopianism vs. realism in this broad sense, whose protagonists 
include Paine, Kant and Cobden on the one side, and Pufendorf, Burke, von 
Gentz on the other, to which Osiander, it seems to me, is referring. Whether 
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this is an accurate and constructive way of thinking about the history of 
international political thought need not detain us. The fact is that Osiander 
detects and draws out from the early twentieth century writings this largely 
implicit contest on international relations and applies the “great debate” notion 
to it. In doing this he perhaps confuses what Carr and others have seen as a 
perennial contestation in the theory and practice of international relations with 
a specific debate between two schools in the fledgling discipline of IR. 
 
CRITICAL INTERNAL DISCURSIVE HISTORY  
 
A number of important points about the field of IR during its formative decades 
were made also in a 1998 piece by Brian Schmidt, summarising the research 
on the inter-war period presented in his major book (1998a). He traces the 
field back to the late nineteenth century and demonstrates that in these early 
years it was a good deal more realist than the conventional IR image 
suggests. Prior to World War I, the field was dominated by a juristic theory of 
the state that had its roots in the writings of Hegel, Fichte, Treitschke, and 
Bluntschli. This resulted in an outlook that was sceptical about the existence 
and efficacy of international law; pessimistic about the prospects of world 
order reform; positive about the role of sovereignty; and accepting of the 
anarchical nature of international society (Schmidt 1998b: 439-443; see also 
Schmidt 1998a: 43-76). The dominant discourse in the interwar period, 
according to Schmidt, was the pluralist rejection of this juristic theory of the 
state. This led to a more optimistic assessment of the role that both 
international law and organization could play in international relations. 
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Pluralist international lawyers made their case primarily on empirical grounds. 
They argued that the juristic theory was not corroborated by state practice. 
Internationally as well as domestically it could be observed that there existed 
a body of rules widely recognised as enjoying the status of law. Their 
argument for extending the rule of law internationally, contrary to the 
conventional image of “idealism” in IR, was based on a positivist conception of 
law (Schmidt 1998b: 443-48; see also Schmidt 1998a: 151-87). With regard to 
international organization, Schmidt demonstrates that interwar scholars did 
not see it as a panacea for international ills based on the assumption of a 
natural harmony of interests. They did not believe the international anarchy 
could be easily transcended. While they supported the League of Nations, 
they were not uncritical of it. Their approach was essentially ameliorative and 
based on acceptance of the continued existence of plurality of self-interested 
states, and an awareness of the obstacles to international cooperation 
presented by national sovereignty (Schmidt 1998b: 449-52). For these 
reasons Schmidt concludes that the academic practice of IR during the 
interwar period cannot be construed as idealistic, and in line with Booth (1991, 
1996), Long and Wilson (1995) and Little (1996), he contends that 
stigmatising the field in this way had damaging consequences for subsequent 
theorising. He also concludes that the sharp distinction conventionally drawn 
in IR between “idealist” and “realist” phases is false. The IR field of the late 
1930s and 1940s was marked not by a clean break between one kind of 
theorising and another but by a shift of emphasis, away from international law 
and organization towards international politics and the dynamics of power. 
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Schmidt’s method of analysis is “critical internal discursive history”. He defines 
his subject as the “discursive practices of the early field of IR”, which he 
conceives as “taking place within the institutional setting of the American 
discipline of political science” (Schmidt 1998b: 434). His object is to 
“reconstruct as accurately as possible the evolution of the discrete 
conversation of academic international relations” between those who “self-
consciously and institutionally thought of themselves” of contributing to the 
professional study of international relations in its formative years. The sources 
he examines are journal articles, textbooks, professional conference papers, 
manuscripts, and other “discursive artefacts of the field’s past” (Schmidt 
1998b: 439; Schmidt 1998a: 1-14, 37-42). This is a legitimate way of 
circumscribing, sociologically and geographically, a potentially vast and 
daunting field of study. It is important to be aware, however, of three 
limitations. Firstly, one wonders whether it can be usefully extended to other 
contexts, particularly the geographical location of the most vibrant and 
extensive “conversation” about international relations during the interwar 
years, the UK. The UK conversation was a broad public one. There were 
insufficient academic posts, departments, and journals in the field of IR more 
formally defined to permit the kind of discrete discursive activity to which 
Schmidt alludes. In brief, IR was insufficiently institutionalised. Its infancy as a 
branch of specialist academic learning was perhaps even greater than Carr, 
one of its early professors, suggested (Carr 1939: 3-15). Until the 1950s, the 
formal IR component of (in Wight’s sense) “international theory” was small. 
While journals such as The Round Table and International Affairs existed, 
from 1910 and 1922 respectively, it is significant that until the 1950s and 
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1960s the vast majority of contributors to them were not professional students 
of international relations—not in the sense of personnel who “self-consciously 
and institutionally thought of themselves” of contributing to the professional 
study of international relations. The first unequivocally IR journal in the UK 
was Millennium: Journal of International Studies which dates from 1971 
followed by the British Journal (later Review) of International Studies in 1975. 
The professional association which established the latter journal, the British 
International Studies Association (BISA), was also founded in 1975—though it 
is important to note that this association has always conceived itself as multi-
disciplinary, and the annual conference it has run since that time has always 
been conceived as a multi-disciplinary forum for debate about the subject. 
Before then the International Studies Conferences were held, initially under 
the auspices of the International Institute for International Cooperation, from 
1928 to 1950 (see Long 2006), and the ‘Bailey Conferences’ of which 14 were 
held until they were superseded by the BISA Conference. The point of all this 
is that the field of IR is hard to define in the early British context. Schmidt’s 
method of analysis makes more sense in the American context. The 
professional study of international relations in the US has from the outset 
“resided in, and been influenced by, the American discipline of political 
science” (Schmidt 1998b: 434). For the most part, American IR is a sub-field 
of Political Science. Chairs in political science in US universities date back to 
the 1850s and departments back to the 1880s. The American Political 
Science Association (APSA) was founded in 1903 with international law, 
imperialism, and sovereignty among its most important topics of discussion 
(Schmidt 1998b: 439-42). While the International Studies Association (ISA) 
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was not founded until 1959, the discursive artefacts pertaining to international 
relations accumulated within political science were by that time substantial. 
Most importantly, the institutional locale of nearly all the main contributors to 
intellectual debate about international relations in the US in the period of our 
concern was political science. But this does not encompass all the main 
contributors. The second limitation of Schmidt’s method is that important 
contributors such as Addams, Lippmann and Niebuhr, by dint of there non-
involvement in political science, are excluded from the picture. A third 
limitation is that there may be some artificiality in relating the history of a 
social subject such as IR purely in terms of its internal conversations, 
relationships and dynamics. External events have often played an important 
role in the generation of ideas, and the strengthening of one position vis-à-vis 
another (see Bell 2001: 120-21)—though Schmidt is right to distance himself 
from the straightforward cause and effect relationship sometimes posited. 
 
One general point follows from these observations. The implicit or explicit 
sociological and geographical scope of the subject to be investigated (whether 
this is the discipline of IR or the field or something broader such as 
“international theory” or “international thought”) has an important bearing on 
what is discovered and what conclusions are reached. Perhaps insufficient 
attention has thus far been given to this in the debate about the first great 
debate (and the intellectual/disciplinary history of IR more generally). Mixing 
these things up has certainly led to a lot of confusion (see e.g. the discussion 
of Olson and Groom (1991: 46-134) in Osiander 1989: 411, and Wilson 2003: 
14-15). 
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WHIGGISH  REALIST  DISCIPLINARY HISTORY  
 
Building on the work on Dryzek and Leonard (1988), Cameron Thies argues 
that disciplinary history can never be neutral. It always involves a process of 
legitimation and deligitimation. It also plays a large hand in identity 
construction. In particular, those writing the history affirm their identity by 
demonstrating how their perspective “is rationally superior to all competitors 
past and present” (Thies 2002: 149). Disciplinary histories tend to be either 
Whiggish or sceptical. Sceptics are dismissive towards the past, Whigs 
condescending. The Whigs view the past from the perspective of the 
concerns of the present. They ignore the contextual nature of the concerns of 
the past, and view their approach as best by virtue of its ability to explain the 
present. According to Thies, the story of the first great debate is a Whiggish 
story told by realists (Thies 2002: 150; see also Ashworth 2006: 308). “[T]he 
realists created a unified, nameable paradigm (‘idealism’) that they could use 
as a straw man to demonstrate the utility and progressive nature of their own 
approach, and provide a basis for their own disciplinary history” (Thies 2002: 
173). The function of this history, involving the victory of “realism” over 
“idealism” was to legitimate realism and deligitimate idealism. 
 
There is much in Thies’ account that adds to, or corroborates, existing 
knowledge. He is right to assert that a “multiplicity of discourses” concerning 
international relations ran through the inter-war period (Thies 2002: 154), and 
that “idealism” did not exist in a unified form (Thies 2002: 171). He brings to 
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the surface the long-submerged ideas of inter alia Edwin Ginn (founder of the 
World Peace Foundation and publisher of International Organization), Clyde 
Eagleton, Ely Culbertson (federalist and pioneer of contract bridge), and 
C.E.M. Joad. He convincingly shows the extent to which they were aware of 
the obstacles in the path of their preferred vision of world order, and the 
gradualism that they not only envisaged but recommended. In this sense they 
were considerably more realistic than the self-styled realists were prepared to 
concede.3 He rightly points out that Osiander, rather than rejecting the idealist 
paradigm as a realist invention, accepts its existence and reconstructs its 
content. In doing this, however, Osiander mirrors realists by “repackaging the 
past to fit the present” (Thies 2002: 154). As with the initial realist 
construction, Osiander’s reconstruction could be seen as an exercise in 
presentist justification—an implicit or explicit attempt to strengthen a neo-
idealist research paradigm by rescuing the reputation of the idealists that 
preceded it and tracing its roots back to the formative years of the field. 
Finally, Thies’ convincingly applies IR Dryzek and Leonard’s insight that 
“Whiggish historians” often point to a few “precursors” of their paradigm who 
nearly “got it right” and co-opt them into their paradigm. He gives as examples 
“utopian realists” or “liberal realists” such as Carr, Herz and Wright (Thies 
2002: 152). In doing so he implicitly problematises Carr’s realism, a move not 
always adequately made in the revisionist literature (see e.g. Osiander 1998: 
422-23). 
 
There are, however, a number of problems with Thies’ account. First, he 
states that “[i]n order to understand the realist-‘idealist’ debate we must begin 
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with an excavation of the ‘idealist’ writings of the inter-war period” (Thies 
2002: 152). But oddly no reference is made to the first systematic attempt to 
excavate these writings (Long and Wilson 1995). Instead, Thies relies on 
Quincy Wright’s The Study of International Relations, published a full 40 years 
earlier. Had Thies consulted the Long and Wilson volume he would have 
avoided some errors. For example, his focus is on disciplinary history. He 
understands the first great debate as a disciplinary debate. Those inhabiting 
the (defeated) idealist paradigm are habitually referred to as “scholars”. Yet if 
the notion of a first great debate between idealism and realism is to make any 
sense it has to be acknowledged that this was, as mentioned above, a 
broader public debate, certainly as far as Britain is concerned. Among its 
leading protagonists were Angell, a journalist turned professional writer and 
political publicist, and Woolf, a colonial civil servant turned publisher, writer 
and Labour party intellectual. Of course one does not need to be an academic 
to be a scholar, but Thies uses the terms interchangeably. While certainly 
intellectuals, Angell and Woolf among others were neither academics nor 
scholars (see Ceadel 2009). The object of their work was not knowledge-
generation but public persuasion. Throughout his article, Thies frequently 
refers to his specimens of interwar thought as “scholars” (e.g. pp. 159, 161, 
162).4 But how many of them were in any meaningful sense scholars? Some 
biographical information of the more obscure or forgotten figures would have 
helped. But the point here is that Thies missed an opportunity to stress that 
his “diverse discourses” of inter-war thinking were conducted among a 
remarkably diverse group of interlocutors—publicists, peace campaigners, 
journalists, politicians, public servants, and the occasional academic. 
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Secondly Thies worries, methodologically, whether his “random sampling 
approach” to inter-war writing will lead to the exclusion of some mainstream 
scholars. He uses “mainstream” to refer to “those scholars from the past 
currently identified as representative of thought” during the period (Thies 
2002: 153-4). The problem is that among the figures from the past currently 
identified as representative of the thought of the period are some notable non-
scholars. Thies projects backwards disciplinary activity to a time when 
consciousness of such activity in a field understood as IR barely existed. He 
thus decontextualises the discourse under study when the very objective of 
this kind of historiographical work is to contextualise it more thoroughly. 
 
Thirdly, even if we accept that the first great debate is a story told by realists, 
the idea that it is a Whiggish story seems to me to be based on a thin 
interpretation of what Butterfield originally had in mind (Butterfield 1965). It is 
true that Carr, Herz, Wolfers, Morgenthau and others saw 
utopianism/idealism/liberalism/moralism (as they variously conceived it) as 
flawed, and realism (or their particular version of it) as a step in the right 
direction. It is also true that they made little attempt to contextualise the ideas, 
beliefs, and assertions they were criticising, and that their primary concern 
was to establish the superiority of their own position, judged in terms of its 
ability to explain the present. But Butterfield’s understanding of the Whig 
interpretation of history goes well beyond this, and there are some senses in 
which the application of this label to mid-twentieth century realism is singularly 
inapt. The richness of this understanding defies simple summary, but 
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essentially the Whig historian conceives his subject in terms of the 
progressive unfolding of some currently valued principle such as liberty. He 
traces a line back through “anticipations” of the present to its “roots” in the 
past, identifying along the way the friends and enemies of progress toward his 
ideal, the universal validity of which he does not stop to question (Butterfield 
1965: 5-12). Historical data are extracted from their context in the service of 
an extraneous principle. In the process one of the most difficult historical jobs, 
the separation of what is important from what is unimportant in the countless 
mass of facts, is rendered simple. The Whig conception of history is linear 
when in fact, according to Butterfield, history is a labyrinth of multiple causes 
and multiple effects, a product of a complex series of interactions in which 
outcomes are not really outcomes but mediations—mediations between 
conflicting wills and forces that are rarely the direct product of intentions 
(Butterfield 1965: 44-5). In brief, the Whig historian generalizes, judges, 
abridges, simplifies, and abstracts. He (and in Butterfield the historian is 
always a “he”) imposes a pattern on history according to some unquestioned 
abstract principle. In particular he “organises the whole course of centuries on 
what is really a directing principle of progress” (Butterfield 1965: 101; see also 
Schmidt 1998a: 16-21; Sylvest 2004: 411-14). 
 
A lot more could be added to this summary of Butterfield’s subtle and richly 
textured understanding of his “Whig interpretation”. It serves to demonstrate, 
however, that to describe the realist story of the first great debate as a 
Whiggish story is tenuous at best. Firstly, Butterfield’s understanding relates 
to the interpretation of centuries, to epochs, perhaps the whole of human 
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history, not to a parochial debate, spanning a small number of years, of minor 
significance in the grand historical scheme of things.5 Secondly, one does not 
see in the realist story the progressive unfolding of some currently valued 
principle, but simply criticism of a group of writers on a variety of grounds. 
Thirdly, it might be true that realists simplified a complex ideational reality and 
took a short cut through this reality to arrive at their preferred position. But this 
might be seen as part and parcel of political discourse, particularly at times of 
extreme crisis. A propos the “idealists” themselves were not above such 
tactics. It would in a way be an insult to their intelligence to assume that they 
were (see Wilson 2000: 183-93). Fourthly, Butterfield’s essay is a critique of a 
trend in the professional study of history. It seems odd to apply it to a group of 
non-historians (though Carr was later to become one) whose intention was 
not to write history at all, but to demonstrate the validity of a set of 
propositions concerning power, cooperation, peace, and international order. 
Finally, in terms of the accounts of, or assumptions about, the actual historical 
process one could argue that it was the “idealists,” not the realists, who were 
the Whigs. It was they, and certainly not the realists, who tended to tell the 
story of modern international relations in terms of the gradual unfolding of 
progress—even if the subtlety with which they did this has tended, from Carr 
onwards, to be underestimated. That is why applying the Whig label to 
realists, even though one can understand what Thies is getting at, is 
ultimately inapposite. They were primarily critics, though not unqualified (see 
e.g. Cozette 2008; Scheuerman 2008), of the idea of history as progress. By 
applying the Whig label, Thies traps himself in a set of linguistic associations 
that leads to some highly inapposite assertions e.g. that the Whiggish realists 
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contended than “realism has proven more progressive than ‘idealism’” (Thies 
2002: 162). In certain respects an advance on “idealism” by all means, but 
“more progressive” carries with it a bundle of inappropriate connotations. 
 
PERFUNCTORY TRADITIONALISM? 
 
The central point of Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran’s analysis is that 
the first great debate is a retrospective creation designed to serve certain 
meta-theoretical purposes. Its persistence is a result of “perfunctory 
traditionalism” (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 107)—the tendency of the 
discipline to continually reproduce convenient orthodoxies. Their case is made 
in a broader historiographical analysis of how the story of the field in terms of 
a series of “great debates” took root. With regard to the first great debate they 
argue that, given what Wilson (1998) revealed regarding the “volley of 
responses” Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis provoked, it would be inaccurate 
to conclude that this debate is entirely mythical. The first great debate, they 
contend, is a partially valid way of describing what took place in and around 
IR in the late 1930s and early 1940s. It is a half-truth and a caricature rather 
than a complete fiction (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 91).6 They accept that 
Carr played “a key role in popularising a divide between realism and 
utopianism” but argue that the primary source of the idea of a great debate 
between them is not located in the inter-war or wartime periods. In fact it is of 
much more recent origin.  
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Quirk and Vigneswaran’s main contribution is to reveal how the notion of a 
great debate about American foreign policy morphed from the publication of 
Morgenthau’s In Defense of the National Interest in 1951, through the writings 
of Tannenbaum, Niebuhr, Wolfers, Herz, Waldo, Wright, Fox and Kaplan into 
a “First Great IR Debate” between idealism and realism of the 1920s and 
1930s. The principal architects of this half-truth, or semi-myth, were Holsti, 
Banks, Lapid and Maghroori in their surveys of the field of the 1970s and 
1980s. In these surveys this debate was pushed back at least a decade from 
original references to it. Moreover, "idealism” and “realism” became coherent 
and sharply dichotomised schools or traditions of thought within the discipline 
of IR. The focus thus became narrower (the discipline of IR rather than wider 
public debate on foreign affairs), the temporal location shifted (from the 1950s 
to the 1920s and 30s), and the categories hardened (losing the qualifications 
and doubts about an idealist-realist dichotomy expressed by among others 
Wright, Waldo, and Fox) (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 99-103; see also 
Ashwoth 1999: 126-9). The notion of a series of great debates thereby 
entered into disciplinary folklore by virtue of a series of brief accounts the 
main concern of which was not historical accuracy but the “situation and 
validation certain metatheoretical contests” (e.g. science versus tradition, 
problem-solving theory versus critical theory, positivism versus post-
positivism) (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 103). Quirk and Vigneswaran thus 
show that while realists had a hand in the construction of the notion of a great 
interwar IR debate between idealism and realism in which the latter were 
victorious, the construction of this “edifice” was far from a realist conspiracy 
(thus corroborating Wilson 1998: 14-15). They show how intellectual 
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exchanges of the 1920s-1940s became detached from their historical and 
intellectual moorings and were represented, misleadingly, as an “analogue of 
later contests” (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 94). While, for example, the 
contributions to “second” and “third” great debates could be assessed by 
reference to works and ideas internal to the IR discipline, such a framework 
was inappropriate when it came to earlier “scholarship.” 
 
There is a problem, however, with this formulation. Much of this “scholarship,” 
as I have argued, was not scholarship in any meaningful sense. Akin to Thies, 
Quirk and Vigneswaran get themselves caught in a linguistic trap, in this 
instance by using a term denoting the very academic/disciplinary dialogue 
from which they want to break free. As with Thies they refer to Angell as a 
“scholar”—consolidating again by their choice of words the very image they 
are trying to unsettle. In no shape or form, as we have seen, was Angell a 
scholar. They also refer to the first debate in terms of “scholars attacking their 
colleagues’ works” (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 104-5)—again cementing 
the very image of a disciplinary debate that the substance of their article 
seeks to erode. They are right to say that to properly comprehend the 
international thought of the 1920-1940s a wider socio-political and foreign 
policy context needs to be invoked (thus echoing e.g. Long 1995; Wilson 
1996, 2003; Sylvest 2004); and that there are dangers in seeking to conduct 
disciplinary historiography in terms of an exclusively internalist approach (e.g. 
Schmidt’s critical internal discursive history), particularly when it comes to the 
inter-war period (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 94). But given their 
understanding of inter-war debates about international relations as not for the 
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most part disciplinary debates, it seems odd that that they maintain as their 
object of study disciplinary history. It should logically be something broader, 
such as “history of international thought.” To a degree, therefore, they seem to 
have slipped into the very “perfunctory traditionalism” they so skilfully expose. 
Like Thies, by the vocabulary they use they project backwards a disciplinary 
consciousness to a period when this consciousness was at best embryonic—
certainly as far as the UK is concerned. 
 
THE REALISM OF IDEALISM? 
 
In Ashworth’s view what is striking, when revisiting works on international 
affairs in the inter-war period, is not an “idealist-realist” debate, but a debate 
about: “does capitalism cause war?”: appeasement versus collective security; 
and (in the US) intervention versus abstention. He finds little evidence that a 
realist-idealist debate “occurred at all in the form in which modern IR writers 
suppose” (Ashworth 2002: 34-5). There was, for example, virtually no 
discussion of the relative merits of an “idealist” versus a “realist” approach in 
any of the IR and political science journals of the time. In Ashworth’s view the 
“idealist-realist dichotomy” is a post-WWII realist construction (Ashworth 2002: 
48; see also Ashworth 1999: 106-29). 
 
One of Ashworth’s contributions is to correct a major misunderstanding in the 
IR literature: that it was the “idealists” who were the appeasers not the 
realists. He shows that the latter, because of their respect for power and their 
greater inclination towards pragmatism, were the more inclined towards 
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appeasing the dictators—though Morgenthau’s stance towards them 
toughened over time and his close intellectual ally, Niebuhr, was highly critical 
of the Munich agreement (Ashworth 2002: 42; Ashworth 1999: 118). The 
“idealists,” i.e. those who supported the League and collective security, were 
early (from at least 1931) objectors to the means and ends of the fascist 
Powers. It is their uncompromising stand against fascism, compared with the 
more pragmatic stance of, say, Carr (see e.g. Haslam 1999: 57-80; Wilson 
2000: 184-5), that has proved over time to have been the more realistic. 
There is, however, one problem with Ashworth’s analysis of appeasement that 
is worth pointing out. While he acknowledges that some critics of 
appeasement consistently opposed increased expenditure on armaments and 
offered alternatives that were far from cogent, and thus cannot escape some 
culpability for the sorry state that followed, he fails to consider the 
responsibility of internationalists such as Angell, Zimmern, Murray and Woolf 
in laying the psychological conditions of appeasement in the 1920s. Here I am 
thinking of their anti-war rhetoric, the euphemisms they employed for war (e.g. 
‘enforcement’, ‘sanctions’, ‘common action against aggression’), and their 
failure to spell out in relatively good times the true cost in terms of blood and 
money that a functioning system of collective security would entail (see e.g. 
Wilson 2003: 68-73; Sylvest 2004: 420-23). 
 
Another contribution Ashworth makes is to show how the terms idealism and 
realism entered into public debate on foreign policy in the late 1930s. Those 
advocating collective security through the League were increasingly branded 
“idealists” by those arguing for a return to a traditional (and for them more 
 24 
realistic) approach to security involving military alliances, secret diplomacy 
and the balance of power (Ashworth 2006: 293-8). But according to Ashworth 
this “name-calling” (and it might be added, “branding”) in public debate did not 
reach the level of academic discourse until Carr’s use of “realism” in 1939. 
Carr, and later Morgenthau, took a label used in popular debate and “gave it a 
metaphysics” (Ashworth 2002: 46-7; Ashworth 1999: 125). Under the name 
“realism,” that is, they took a well established essentially nineteenth century 
nationalist outlook on foreign policy and constructed a more elaborate general 
theory around it. It can be questioned, however, whether this description 
applies to Carr as much as it does to Morgenthau. My main criticism, indeed, 
of Ashworth’s contribution concerns not so much his representation of 
“idealism,” but his representation of realism. In his desire for restorative justice 
he arguably takes too much away from the realists, Carr in particular. He 
states, for example, that Carr and Morgenthau’s reasons for opposing a 
liberal/utopian view of the world coincide (Ashworth 1999: 111; Ashworth 
2002: 35). Apart from at a basic level e.g. they both felt that the 
liberals/idealists/utopians underestimated the factor of power, I am not sure 
this is true. Carr’s opposition was based on a view of history; Morgenthau’s on 
a view of Man. For Carr utopianism was the ideology of a self-interested class 
designed to perpetuate an economically obsolescent social and political order. 
For Morgenthau ‘idealism’ was a political outlook, well intentioned but 
dangerously blind to the fearful and power-seeking nature of Man. Carr’s 
rejection is rooted in historical materialism, Morgenthau’s in pre-rationalist 
political philosophy (see Murray 1997: 47-69). I am not sure it can be 
maintained that Carr, like Morgenthau, believed in certain inescapable “laws 
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of behaviour … established by human nature” (Ashworth 2002: 42); or like 
Morgenthau and Wight that he believed in “the universality of the balance of 
power, and … [the] cyclical recurrence of history” (Ashworth 2002: 42). In 
fairness Ashworth recognises that Carr and Morgenthau “differ on crucial 
points” (Ashworth 2002: 35), and that there is an important progressive 
dimension to Carr’s thinking (Ashworth 2006: 299; cf. Navon 2001: 612), But 
generally he glosses over the diversity of realism, paying insufficient attention 
to the radical aspects of Carr, and the extent to which Carr’s essentially 
historicist argument against the “utopians” differed from Morgenthau’s 
essentially deontological argument (Molloy 2006: 15-34). It is also true that 
Ashworth acknowledges that Carr’s realism was in some ways hedged. He 
says, for example, that he “moved beyond his realist critique” with the 
publication of Nationalism and After in 1945 (Ashworth 2002: 38). But this 
movement began in fact as early as Chapter 6 of his 14 chapter The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis. This is one of the factors that makes Carr a problematic realist 
according to all recent understandings of that term in IR (see e.g. Wilson 
2001; Molloy 2006: 51-74). Ashworth succumbs to the temptation of the 
idealists themselves when confronting Carr’s multifaceted thesis—that of 
trying to squeeze it into an ideologically convenient vessel. 
 
Yet there are some aspects of Ashworth’s representation of “idealism,” along 
with that of realism, that require modification. It could be argued that in 
correcting some of the misrepresentations of “idealism,” and seeking to 
restore its reputation, Ashworth overlooks some of its significant 
shortcomings. Taking one of the three charges Carr levelled at 
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idealism/utopianism that I identified in my book on Woolf, Ashworth disputes 
that utopians “pay little attention to facts and analysis of cause and effect, 
devoting their energies instead to the elaboration of visionary projects for the 
attainment of ends which they have in view” (Wilson 2003: 20). According to 
Ashworth, many so called utopians during the interwar period paid much 
attention to facts and they were deeply concerned with cause and effect. They 
also spent little time elaborating visionary projects. The charge is therefore 
without foundation (Ashworth 2006: 301). It is more accurate to say, however, 
not that the charge is without foundation but that it is an exaggeration. It is 
true that they rarely put forward blueprints for change, though there are 
exceptions even among the five figures (Angell, Woolf, Noel-Baker, Brailsford, 
and Mitrany) to whom Ashworth gives his attention (e.g. Woolf’s 1944 The 
International Post-War Settlement). To the extent they can be considered 
utopians they are “process” rather than “end-point” utopians (Booth 1991).  It 
is also true that they produced works that were empirically detailed, and 
contained considerable research, e.g. Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa 
(1919) and Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments (1925). But it 
is important to note that even these highly factual books were not written in 
the spirit of detached, scientific enquiry. The huge amount of empirical 
material contained within their pages was gathered to confirm conclusions 
already reached, namely that the primary motive for European imperialism in 
Africa was economic exploitation, and private arms manufacturers had a 
vested interest in war and were actively engaged in bringing it about. These 
authors were no doubt interested in relations of cause and effect but not in the 
rigorous and detached exploration of them. They were first and foremost 
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advocates not analysts. While they were engaged in research they were not 
scholars. 
 
A further charge of Carr is that utopians failed to appreciate the self interested 
character of their thought, and in particular that their espousal of universal 
interests amounted to nothing more than the promotion and defence of a 
particular status quo (see Wilson 2003: 20). According to Ashworth one part 
of this charge can be easily dismissed. Rather than promoting and defending 
the status quo his five “idealist” thinkers were “deeply critical” of it (Ashworth 
2006: 303). They were all in favour of radical changes to the way international 
affairs were conducted. This is true but only up to a point. So many interwar 
progressives were like shop owners cognisant of the fact that an overhaul of 
the business, perhaps radical, was long overdue but at no time willing to 
contemplate a change in ownership. Firstly, few of them questioned (Toynbee 
is an exception here) the continued hegemony of the West and more narrowly 
the Anglosphere (as it is now called) in world politics. Indeed, much of what 
they said was designed, consciously or consciously, to keep Britain in the 
front line of nations—to maintain, that is, the influence of Britain, its ideas, 
values and institutions, in a world the centre of gravity of which was shifting. 
This applies to Carr’s brand of internationalism as much does to those of his 
liberal critics. Secondly, all of these men, even those critical of colonialism, 
possessed an imperial mindset. They believed that what they said mattered, 
and that the opinions of forward thinking British intellectuals such as 
themselves represented the most advanced thinking in the world. At no time 
did it occur to them that their prescriptions for world order, whether functional 
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or federal, might be an expression of hegemonic decline, and that the eminent 
good sense they exhibited might not appear quite so eminent to Powers on 
the rise. Thirdly, all of these figures argued for international government in 
one form or another. But is international government the ideology of declining 
power? It is at least a valid question that no one until Carr thought to ask. So, 
while I agree with Ashworth that many “idealists” were unhappy with the 
status quo and argued for extensive international reform, their position was 
compromised by a pronounced ethno- and for the most part anglo-centricism. 
They too often failed to enquire whether their common sense about the 
peace, or cooperation, or security, or trade, or Germany, or the League, or 
sanctions, was a sense common in other parts of the world (see e.g. Wilson 
2011: 901-9). While I agree that it is important to rescue “idealism”/liberal 
internationalism from the gross distortions and misrepresentations of the past, 
we should not do this at the cost of glossing over its quite considerable 
shortcomings. 
 
A final point on Ashworth’s contribution it is important to mention is that he 
does not, in common with other contributors to the debate, separate carefully 
enough disciplinary history from the broader history of international thought. 
With regard to many of his observations, Ashworth moves rather casually 
from ‘interwar IR’, ‘British IR’, ‘English-speaking IR’, and ‘the work of IR 
scholars’ (and similar formulations), to the more general ‘interwar literature’ 
and ‘writers on international affairs in Britain’ (Ashworth 2006: 292, 294, 298, 
300, 305; see also Ashworth 2002: 24, 34-6). The problem is highlighted in 
the conclusion, entitled ‘Understanding interwar IR’, to his main article 
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(Ashworth 2006: 305-8). In this conclusion Ashworth makes many valuable 
points about how to think about debates in Britain about war and peace and 
related matters during the interwar years. But he presents this as an analysis, 
or revisionist history, of the IR discipline. He mentions specifically eleven 
contributors to these debates, but of these only two, Laski and Carr, were 
academics (Carr post-1936), and only one (Carr) an IR academic (pre-1946). 
Noel-Baker, it is true, was an ex-IR academic, and Mitrany a quasi-academic 
(moving for the most part in policy/think tank circles). But the point here is that 
Ashworth’s history is only tangentially disciplinary history. It is primarily a 
broader history of international thought.7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, I would like to make three general observations about what we 
know now as a result of the research of the last decade or so, and what we 
can do better to enhance our research findings in the future. First, several 
important things about the early history of the field are now well established. 
We know that “idealism/utopianism” did not exist as a distinct school of 
thought during the inter-war period. No group of thinkers ever identified with 
this label. Many thinkers of the period had ideals and believed that their 
achievement was to some degree achievable. “A logic of the realizable ideal,” 
as Sylvest (2004: 427) has nicely put it, informed many of their arguments. 
But these ideals, except in a very broad sense e.g. “peace,” varied 
considerably, as did the methods and processes posited for their 
achievement. This being said, we know that the idea of a first great debate is 
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not a complete fiction. There were lively exchanges on international matters 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. These primarily concerned specific issues of 
foreign policy, but they also involved wider and deeper questions about 
international peace, order, justice, cooperation and conflict. Liberal 
internationalists of various kinds argued against conservatives, some of whom 
saw themselves as “realists,” and socialists of various kinds argued against 
both. But there was never a time when two well defined ideological positions 
did battle. This idea is a post hoc creation of the 1970s and 1980s. While the 
idea of a first great debate has a toe-hold in reality it is best understood as a 
retrospective invention the function of which is not historical veracity but the 
legitimation of certain contemporary theories and approaches (see Bell 2003: 
154; Bell 2001: 120; Bell 2009: 4-9). From the point of view of historical 
accuracy we need in the future to be much more wary, to paraphrase Sylvest 
(2009: 13), of unreflectively projecting current academic concerns, 
boundaries, and debates back on the people or period under scrutiny. 
 
Secondly, greater sensitivity is required to the differences between the two 
principal intellectual contexts within which debate of a broad theoretical kind 
took place about international relations during the inter-war period. In the US, 
exchanges took place inside and outside Political Science, but there is no 
doubt that Political Science was host to, and provided an institutional focal 
point for, substantive theoretical debate to a degree that far exceeded the UK. 
In the UK the debate was a broader social and political debate. While several 
prominent professional students of IR were involved, it took place in a wide 
variety of institutional settings and through a wide variety of media. While IR 
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was making big strides it is important to register that it was tangential to the 
substantive debates on international matters that took place in the UK during 
this period. This is why we need to exercise more caution before labelling 
these debates “IR debates.” More focus is needed on whether our subject is 
the discipline/professional field of IR or international theory/international 
political thought more broadly. If both, then more care needs to be taken not 
to mistake one for the other or unwittingly elide them. Most of us involved in 
reappraising early-mid twentieth century international thought have fallen prey 
to this error of mixing up disciplinary with wider discourses. 
  
Finally, in amending the misrepresentation of “idealism” we need to be careful 
not to misrepresent “realism”. As international theorists (in the Wightian 
sense) and historians of the field we have to be mindful of not substituting a 
caricature of realism for the one of idealism that has done so much damage 
not only to historical understanding but more generally to imaginative and 
productive thinking about our subject. 
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1 It is not entirely clear what Osiander means here. There are four possibilities: 1) IR 
arose as a reaction to the terrible experiences of WW1 and the passionate desire to 
prevent its recurrence; 2) that the early years of IR were dominated by a coherent 
idealist school of thought; 3) that realism demonstrated that the premises of idealism 
were fundamentally flawed; 4) two or three of the above. 
 
2 Osiander’s assertion that Carr’s style of argument ‘is no more rigorous than that of 
those whom he criticised’ (Osiander 1998: 429) seems to me wide of the mark. 
Although the flaws in Carr’s analysis in The Twenty Years’ Crisis and elsewhere are 
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now well known (see e.g. Jones 1998; Cox 2000), he brought to bear a level of 
scientific detachment and analytical depth hitherto unprecedented in IR. 
 
3 Thies fails to identify, however, the domestic analogy that informs so much of their 
work, perhaps unaware of Suganami’s important 1989 study. 
 
4 A mistake fallen into by even as meticulous a scholar as Sylvest. While noting that 
the ‘distinction between academia and politics … is hard to discern in interwar 
debates on international politics’, Sylvest (2004: 410-13) makes the distinction even 
harder to discern by repeatedly referring to Woolf and Angell as ‘scholars’. 
 
5 I do not wish to imply here, of course, that parochial things cannot be important nor 
that the debate about foreign policy and international relations in the 1930s and 1940s 
is not important in a narrower context. 
 
6 Though they confusingly later describe it more uncompromisingly as a ‘myth’ 
(pp.105, 107) and an ‘egregious misrepresentation’ (p. 105). 
 
7 In his earlier work he makes his case regarding the ‘folklore’ of an inter-war IR 
idealist-realist great debate with reference to principally two figures, Angell and 
Woolf, neither of whom were scholars or academics. Only one of the figures regularly 
cited, Zimmern, was an IR academic (Ashworth 1999: 106-29). Despite this all the 
generalizations made refer to the discipline of IR (see esp. pp. 107-8) with only one 
reference to something broader and more accurate (‘the contemporary international 
affairs literature’ p. 126). 
